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Firm strategies are deeply affected by the legal framework which rules the relationships 
between the economic agents regarding monopoly and cartel policy. Undertakings have to 
manoeuvre through a complex universe. Not only must they master the rules of the economic 
game of competition but also the legal rules of competition law which are characteristic of 
competition and add up to the aforementioned.  
First, we must point out that monopoly and cartel policy does not cover all of competition 
law, but at the same time, it goes beyond. The attention drawn to monopolies and agreements 
between the firms is at the heart of modern competition law (more often referred to as 
“antitrust” in the American context and as “competition law” in the European one). 
Competition law at large covers, besides anticompetitive practices specially agreements and 
concerted practices that restrict competition and abuse of dominant position), the restrictive 
practices, merger policy
1
, State aid control and in some countries, unfair competition. 
Monopoly and cartel policy goes somehow beyond competition law alone. Taking into 
account the competition goals is essential to the enforcement of competition law this is why it 
is useful to make those goals clear. 
The consequences of competition law can vary considerably from one country to another (or 
from one period to another), whereas general rules and principles are worded in a fairly 
similar way. Therefore, it is essential to identify the intention of the law-makers and the 
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priorities of the authorities in charge of competition law enforcement. Competition policies 
depend on various views on what competition should be how firms should develop and 
interact with one another. Given the variety of these conceptions, priority must be given to the 
examples of the United States of America and the European Union. Those two areas which 
gave themselves a complete system of competition regulation that are the most influential 
ones in the world. By the way, we can also note the diversity and possibly the convergence of 
competition policies. 
At a high level of abstraction, we can consider that every competition law tends to ensure a 
well-functioning market, by punishing free trading and competition system infringements. 
Such a general definition of the purpose of competition law remains highly uncertain for the 
firms that are the main recipients of that corpus of rules. Indeed, how can they be sure they 
are complying with competition law? 
In fact, the concepts of « competition » «market » or else « free trading » are far from being 
univocal. To provide economic agents with appropriate rules of conduct for the economic 
agents, we must outline the specific substance of those concepts. There are as many monopoly 
and cartel policies as there are economic theories. One of the salient characteristics of 
competition policies is their strong connection to the economic analysis which is everything 
but monolithic. 
Incidentally, the dependence of competition law on economics means that antitrust is an 
« economic law » in various ways. The subject of that law is economic since it is about the 
behaviour of economic agents. Then, that law pursues an economic purpose since it consists 
in reaching certain economic goals that were considered desirable. Finally, that law is also 
economic because of its methods since the enforcement of rules implies the understanding of 
reality through concepts that were originally economic ones (such as the market or the abuse 
of dominant position) and the implementation of an economic reasoning (for instance the 
evaluation of a practice through an assessment of costs and profits linked to that practice). 
The second specificity of the competition policy stems from the fact that it often incorporates 
objectives that cannot be deduced from competition, whatever it means. Competition law can 
indeed be summoned to reach goals which are political (such as the European integration), 
economic (such as the stimulation of innovation) or social (such as the generalization of the 
access to services considered essential). Due to the multiplicity of objectives, the monopoly 
and cartel policies appear rather unpredictable. 
Monopoly and cartel policy presents itself as an important limitation to the freedom of action 
of firms and as a source of risks because some of their behaviours or choices are likely to be 
challenged, even punished by the competition authorities for the sake of the market 
preservation. Yet, firms can be strongly tempted to be harmful to competition insomuch as 
cartel and monopolies or taking advantage of a dominant position are means generally 
efficient for reaching the goals companies are aiming at in a capitalistic economy: the increase 
of profits thanks to the growth of margins and the “quiet life” thanks to a better control of 
their environment. 
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First we will present the bases of monopoly and cartel policy (1) then the rules that result 
from it (2) before taking into account the competition authority decisional practices and their 
consequences on the firms’ strategies (3). 
1. Cartel and monopoly policy: its objectives, its history and its institutions 
 
Backgrounds of cartel and monopoly policy 
Competition policy concerns appear in the late nineteen century mainly because of the 
concentration of economic power induced by the second industrial revolution.  
The Sherman Act promulgated in the US in 1890 kicked off competition policies (Kovacic 
and Shapiro, 1999). In a context of political debates induced by the huge growth of the trusts 
in the US economy and a very significant concentration of economic power, more and more 
concerns raised from the risks of US market foreclosure and from the unfair practices of the 
robber barons. Consequently, political pressures became more and more sensible to prevent 
and to sanction practices, which were likely to impede competition and to compromise finally 
economic freedom. 
Two main kinds of market strategies were prohibited by the Act. The first one is related to 
coordinated practices, the second to unilateral ones. The first section of the Act sanctions all 
kind of coalitions between firms, which are likely to artificially restraint trade between US 
States or with foreign nations. This provision is directed to every contract, combination in the 
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy between competing firms in order to artificially limit 
competition, or in more modern economic words to acquire a collective market power in order 
to maximize their joint profit. The second section of the Sherman Act is all the more 
interesting that it is one of the main sources of divergence between US and European 
competition policy. It deals with unilateral practices. It does not punish abuse of dominant 
position, as it will be the case for European competition law, but monopolization practices. 
Such practices cover all market strategies, which allow a firm to acquire, maintain or extend a 
monopoly power on another base than a competition on the merits. 
The relative vagueness of the concepts introduced by the sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act 
and its enforcement devoted to judicial courts induced severe difficulties in its 
implementation, despite some very memorable cases as the dismantling of the Rockefeller’s 
Standard Oil trust in 1911. As a consequence, the US competition policy framework was 
completed in 1914 by two additional legislative acts. The first one is the Clayton Act, which 
allows, amongst other things, to engage antitrust private law suits. By the way, US 
Department of Justice (DoJ) potential reluctance to engage law suits against firms may be by-
passed by the agents harmed by anticompetitive practices. In addition, the incentives to take 
such legal actions were increased by the possibility to obtain treble damages. In the same time 
the FTC Act was promulgated. The implementation of competition law was not, since 1914, 
the monopoly of the Antitrust Division of the US DoJ but is shared with an independent 
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regulation authority. If the sharing of responsibilities is particularly complex between these 
two bodies, economic history reveals that the FTC could in some occasions compensate what 
appears as an antitrust enforcement cycle, particularly observable for the Antitrust Division. 
Indeed, the enforcement of US competition law is characterized by a very irregular trend. 
Roughly describing, the antitrust laws were enforced without strong conviction during the 
twenties and the beginning of the Great Depression. The climax of such tendency was the 
NIRA – National Industrial Recovery Act – promulgated in 1933 by the first Roosevelt 
administration, which encouraged prices and investment plans coordination among 
competitors as a response to the economic crisis in order to stabilize prices and to comfort 
firm expectations. The second mandate of the Democrat administration from 1936 was 
characterized by a strong shift towards strong antitrust laws enforcement.  Until the end of the 
seventies, US competition policy was influenced by the Harvard School, which was very 
concerned about market structures. It appeared necessary to implement antitrust law suit in 
order to prevent - event to correct -unreasonable concentration of market power. As a 
consequence, Courts were very suspicious towards dominant firms and could enjoin them to 
reduce their market power through asset divestitures or even dismantling.   
The AT&T case in 1982 was the last and a very late manifestation of such logic. Indeed, from 
the sixties, the Harvard approach was harshly criticized by the Chicago School, which 
redeemed several market practices by considering their effective impact upon consumer 
welfare. In other words, no matters of market dominance, the most determinant things are the 
incentive structure. Even a firm is hugely dominant; there is no incentive to behave as a 
monopoly as soon as its market position is contestable, in the sense of the absence of barriers 
of entry or exit. The US competition policy shifts towards a more lenient treatment of 
dominant firms. Extracting the rent induced by market power is seen as legitimate since this 
one was created by past investments, business acumen or even historic accident. Only 
monopolization strictly defined constitutes an infringement of the Section 2 of the Sherman 
Act.  
The rise of the Post-Chicago Synthesis in Antitrust economics since the eighties leads to 
moderate some of the Chicago School normative positions by considering that some strategies 
not always benefit to consumers considering the actual market structures. As a consequence it 
is necessary to perform case-by-case analysis in order to compare potential damages for 
competition with efficiency gains induced by the considered practice. 
Such a more economic approach (associated with a decrease of formalistic analysis) puts into 
relief a concern on false positives, that is to say firms found guilty, while they have just 
competed on the merits. The risk of chilling competition by protecting competitors and not 
competition is taken into consideration, especially because of the cost of such antitrust errors, 
which is significantly aggravated by private law suits in the US context. As a consequence, 
public enforcement of Section 2 sharply declined in the last decade. A DoJ report on 
unilateral practices published in November 2008 constituted a climax for this trend. Its 
5 
 
Version initiale des auteurs du manuscrit publié chez Edward Elgar après modifications, in Dietrich M. and Krafft J., (eds.), 
Handbook on the economics and theory of the firm, Edward Elgar, août 2012, pp.485-497. 
 
withdrawal in May 2009 and a higher activity of FTC could be interpreted as some first but 
fragile clues of a new shift in the US Antitrust Policy. 
Even the European Competition Policy also exhibit a shift from a rule-based approach to a 
more economic appraisal of competition concerns (Petit, 2009), both its history and its 
practices are very specific compared to the US (Gerber, 1998). European competition Law 
must not be considered as a legal transplant of US Antitrust laws operated after the Second 
World War and following the Marshall Plan. European competition policy found its roots in 
some Austrian government bills submitted before the First World War and in the feed-backs 
of the first German Competition Law promulgated in 1923 and implemented – without 
success – during by Weimar Republic. This experience was the object of an in-depth analysis 
realized by the lawyers and the economists, which are grouped during the thirties and the 
forties in the Freiburg University. They developed – mainly in secret – what will become the 
Ordoliberal School, which will exercise a strong influence on the economic policy of the West 
Germany after the war. 
Ordoliberals consider the competition is by itself auto-destructive because it leads the 
concentration of economic power. Such a concentration is an issue per se because it gives 
some coercion capacity upon the access of the others to the market. But economic freedom is 
considered as a prerequisite of politic one, as a consequence it is necessary to help the market 
process to realize its function of dispersion of economic power. A government intervention is 
essential to prevent its natural and irreversible exhaustion. Interventions are necessary to 
prevent such exercise of economic power against the other market participants. Ordoliberal 
scholars advocate either that the dominant firm behaves as it is deprived of any market power 
or some asset divestitures to obtain a structural remedy. We must note, by the way, that if 
government must intervene in order to protect the market process against itself, it is also 
necessary to prevent discretionary intervention. Consequently, such interventions must be 
based on rules. Competition policy in this sense is an essential component of the economic 
constitution. 
Ordoliberals exercised a significant influence on the economic policy of the West Germany 
after the war and on – to some extent - on the shaping of the German competition law 
promulgated in 1957. They also exert an influence on the German negotiators for the Treaty 
of Rome. But is extremely excessive to consider that the treaty provisions relative to 
competition policy are shaped in an ordoliberal way and that they explain by themselves all 
the specificities of the European case law (Akman, 2009). In fact, two very general articles 
constitute the basis of the European competition law. The first one, which is now the article 
101 TFEU, deals with the prohibition of cartel agreements, with some exceptions if they 
contribute to global welfare, as R&D cooperation for example.  The most specific article – 
and the one which induces the main differences between US and European competition policy 
– is the article 102, relative to the abuses of dominant position. 
If we can draw a parallel between the article 101 and article 102 TFEU on one side and 
section 1 and section 2 of the Sherman Act on the other side, by considering the distinction 
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between coordinated and unilateral practices, nonetheless the fact remains that a significant 
difference lies on the treatment of market practices of dominant firms. While, the section 2 
does punish monopolization practices, article 102 does sanction abuses of dominant position. 
Two differences must be underlined. The first one is that the acquisition of a dominant 
position, if we analyze it in this context as a monopoly position, is not directly forbidden by 
EU competition law. On the contrary, US law considers it violates section 2 if this acquisition 
is not made on the merits. A second point is relative to the notion of abuses. The dominant 
position is not sanctioned by itself. The crucial point is to define what could be an abuse of 
such a market position. We will see that one of the main sources of divergences between US 
and EU derives from this point. 
In every case, the article 102 as it was written in 1957 does not explain by itself the specificity 
of EU treatment of dominant firms.  Law is characterized by its open texture. A legal text 
takes its sense through its implementation, through its interpretation by courts. Concerning the 
abuse of dominant position, the ordoliberal influence pass through the decisional practice of 
the European Court of Justice. As Giocoli (2009) considered “The Court made teleology the 
cornerstone of its interpretative strategy […] The Court interpreted the Treaty’s competition 
law provisions according to its own conceptions of what was necessary to achieve the 
integrationary goals”. In other words, the Court interpreted the treaty provisions relative to 
competition law not just as a sanction of anticompetitive practices but also as a tool to 
construct an internal competitive market.  
The role of the European Court of Justice leads us to underline a second difference between 
US and European cases. This difference relies on the institutional framework of competition 
policy implementation. In the US, the Antitrust Division has to bring cases before courts. In 
the European case the Commission makes the inquiries, prepares the case for judgment and 
decides it. In other words, the Commission brings together investigative and adjudicatory 
functions. In this sense, the European procedure is closer than the FTC situation than the DoJ 
one. Nevertheless, the European situation is very specific considering the nature and the 
practice of the judicial review of the decisions of the Commission. This control is realized by 
the Court of Justice (and also at a first stage by the General Court – the former Court of First 
Instance). A Geradin and Petit’s Court of Justice exhaustive analysis of competitive case law 
(2010) established that such control is not exercised in the same way, for merger and 
acquisition decisions or cartel ones and for unilateral practices. They demonstrate that no 
sanctioned firm ever succeeded in challenging a Commission decision on the basis of article 
102 before the Court of Justice. In addition, even if the Commission is inclined to adopt a 
more economic approach in its decisions, it appears that the Court maintains a form based 
approach and follows in its own jurisprudence some cases in which a very extensive 
interpretation of the span of article 102 was made. 
Objectives of cartel and monopoly law 
The intensity or preservation of competition is not the only goal pursued through competition 
law. We can therefore point out that competition policy integrates other goals of economic 
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policy even if the addition of non-competitive goals within competition policy remains 
controversial. 
One of the goals specific to European competition law lies in the will to achieve the 
integration of the European market. This market has successively been described as common 
(common market), single (single market) and internal (internal market). The European 
integration is a goal of a political nature which inspires the European policies and applies 
particularly to the competition field. The idea uttered in the early 50’s and 60’s was that the 
fight against monopolies and even more against cartels aimed at preventing a segmentation on 
the European market. Such segmentation at the firms’ initiative would substitute itself to the 
trade barriers between member-states, which are what the Treaty of Rome precisely wanted to 
abolish. 
By pointing out that competition was not necessarily sought after for itself, but for the 
economic incentives it creates, a wide range of economic goals can turn out to be linked to the 
competition policy. Indeed, it can be judicious to encourage competition only when it 
produces the expected effects. In such perspective, innovation or competitiveness for instance 
can be taken into account in the assessment of potentially anti-competitive structures or 
behaviours. Intellectual property rights which protect innovation are thus more and more 
acknowledged and integrated in the enforcement of competition law, whereas those two 
branches of law were formerly presented as belonging to opposite rationale. Intellectual 
property rights (patents, brands, etc.) have the same kind of effects as legal monopolies at a 
smaller scale. They can stimulate or restrict competition depending on circumstances. Taking 
into account those complex economic effects leads to a sophisticated application of 
competition law.  
Such an approach based upon the ultimate goals competition law paves the way to an 
integration of the industrial policy within the competition policy. That connection seems 
unnatural to all who link competitive market economy to the laissez-faire principle. Yet we 
must admit that in practice the concern for the promotion of efficient and competitive firms is 
far from being external to competition policies. The pursuit of the critical size of firms can 
justify a certain tolerance towards national or European monopolies (and to a smaller extent 
towards cartels) when the firms in question have to vie with foreign competitors. The taking 
into consideration of international competition by the national, federal or European authorities 
explains that competition policy could be tinged with public interventionism in favour of 
national champions.  
The barrier between competition law and other public policies is not impenetrable. We can 
often notice that free trading does not necessarily carry out achievements such as energetic 
independence, general access to medical care, efficiency of public transportation, 
minimization of environmental damage.  
A market-based economic system raises the delicate question of the articulation between 
competition on that market and the market’s ability to respect the restrictions or to deliver the 
expected results. The handling of those complex policies is readily entrusted to sector-specific 
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regulation authorities. But since regulation does not necessarily supplant the application of 
competition law and since there is anyway a residual field of economic activities which are 
not covered by any specific regulation, competition authorities have balance competition with 
other economic and social aims. Such reasoning can be used to appraise cooperation between 
industrial firms while taking into consideration the advantages of this cartel in terms of 
environmental impacts. 
The multiplicity of competition, but also economic, social and political goals makes 
competition policy very complex. Its implementation may give way to very diverse, therefore 
unpredictable solutions for the economic agents that are subjected to it. That policy must be 
translated into a corpus of legal rules. That legal framework is likely to limit the arbitrariness 
and therefore to increase legal security for firms.  
2. Implementation of cartel and monopoly policy 
 
The main component of monopoly and cartel policy is antitrust law. The fundamental rules 
that prohibit anticompetitive practices lie in the European Treaties for European Law and in 
the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act for American law. These provisions are supplemented 
by additional statutes, regulations, case-law and guidelines issued by competition authorities.  
The European and American competition laws are framed in general terms that are fairly 
similar. Whereas the implementation of these sets of rules may differ and even diverge, the 
general concepts of competition law (restrictive practices,  relevant market…) are shared by 
European and American policy-makers and beyond.  
The presentation of the main rules of antitrust law can be divided into 3 parts. First, one 
should say what kinds of firms or groups of firms are targeted by antitrust law. Then, one 
should precise what kind of behaviours constitutes anticompetitive practices.  
The firms that are targeted by antitrust law 
The firms that may undermine competition are, on the one hand, the monopolies and more 
generally, businesses holding a dominant position, and on the other hand, the firms involved 
in cartels and in other restrictive practices.  
Any attempt to monopolize a particular market by a firm or even a group of firms is 
prohibited in American law as well as in European law. For instance, the Sherman Act §2 
targets “every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or 
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce 
among several States, or with foreign nations”. Article 102 of the Treaty on the functioning of 
the European Union (formerly Article 86 then Article 82 of the previous European Treaties) 
states that “Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the 
common market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the 
common market (…)”.  
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The dominant position is not an autonomous concept. It depends on the market where the firm 
sells its products or services, which is called the ‘relevant market’. The dominant position 
refers to a substantial market power. In the Hoffman-La Roche case, the ECJ gives the 
following definition of the dominant position: “the dominant position (…) relates to a position 
of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it to prevent effective 
competition being maintained on the relevant market by affording it the power to behave to an 
appreciable extent independently of its competitors, its customers and ultimately of the 
consumers” (Case 85/76, 13 February 1979).  
The market share is the first but not the only criterion to determine whether a particular firm 
or group of firms has a dominant position on the market. It also depends on market structure  
i.e. the relative market-shares, the potential competition (the likelihood of potential new 
competitors to enter the market) and even on firm’s performance (high profits may be a piece 
of evidence of market dominance). But, as often in antitrust matters, it can be delicate to say 
whether a firm makes a lot of money and is a leader on its market because it is inherently 
superior and outperforms its competitors or because of illegal anticompetitive practices. In the 
first case, any intervention of competition authorities may distort and severely damage the 
competition process instead of restoring competition.  
 
Agreements and concerted practices, including cartels, which restrict free trading and 
competition between businesses, are the second category of anticompetitive practices 
prohibited by antitrust law. Thus Sherman Act §1 states that: “Every contract, combination in 
the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the 
several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal (…)”. In European law, “The 
following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market: all agreements 
between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices 
which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the 
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the common market (…)” (article 
101 TFEU, formerly article 85 then article 81 of the previous European Treaties).  
A wide range of coordinated actions fall within the scope of these provisions: from formal 
anticompetitive agreements to concerted parallelism and even to a tacit acquiescence to a 
conduct that disrupt the market. As long as firms are independent economic entities, they are 
supposed to compete and not cooperate with each other, except if the cooperation between the 
firms is required by the government. Unlike dominant position, restrictive agreements involve 
at least two firms but they can be located at different stages of the production / distribution 
process. Thus, a distinction is made between horizontal agreements involving firms at the 
same level of production, like most of the cartels and vertical restraints or even joint ventures 
that might also raise competition issues.  
The behaviors that are prohibited  
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The particular position of a firm – market dominance or collusion – is usually not sufficient to 
incur sanctions by competition authorities, especially in Europe where antitrust has never 
been used to dismantle monopolies as such. Only specific collusion and abuse of dominant 
position are subject to scrutiny as anticompetitive practices. Besides, some cartels and 
restrictive agreements can be cleared under the rule of reason standard or benefit from 
individual or group exemptions.  
Cartels and other collusions are prohibited when they are agreements or practices that have as 
their objective or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the 
market. European and American law list the main anticompetitive practices such as price-
fixing, market sharing, collective boycott and concerted limitation of production. Some of 
them are prohibited per se – price fixing based on horizontal agreement for instance – 
whereas other practices are more ambivalent. For instance, vertical restraints that limit the 
freedom of resellers can improve the economic process and even enhance the competition 
between several distribution networks and brands. In such a case, the practice deserves to be 
carefully analyzed to determine whether the restriction should be permitted because it does 
not actually result in a restraint of trade and competition or not. 
As far as monopoly and dominant position are concerned, attention must be paid to ‘abuse’. 
Again, the law-makers, judges and competition authorities provide examples of abusive 
behaviors: predatory pricing, strategic deterrence, foreclosure of adjacent market, refusal to 
supply an essential facility to a competitor, etc. The Clayton Act contains specific provisions 
about discrimination. Thus, it is not allowed to apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent 
transactions with other trading counterparts, thereby placing them in competitive 
disadvantage. It is actually often delicate to make a distinction between illegal abuses and 
acceptable legal strategies of firms within their economic environment.  
For the practices that are not judged as illegal per se, the needed assessment can take place 
following different methods and procedures. There is currently a mix of self-assessment based 
on guidelines and detailed regulations, and ex-ante or ex-post evaluation given by competition 
authorities and courts. In EU law the so-called ‘block exemption’ regulations exclude the 
application of competition law for certain agreements. This approach can improve the legal 
certainty for the firms by providing them with a dividing line between legal and illegal 
practices. The alternative and complementary system based on individual exemptions gives 
competition authorities a flexibility that can be said stretching far beyond the application of 
clear-cut established competition rules. Given the sensitivity of competition matters, law leads 
to choices that are part of competition policy.  
3. A transatlantic comparison of cartel and monopoly policy implementation 
 
If we can spotlight some divergences between US and EU enforcement of competition law, it 
is mainly on unilateral practices. Indeed, for coordinated practices, it is possible to observe a 
same tendency constituted by an increasing severity in the sanction of collusive agreements. 
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The fines imposed for such anticompetitive practices sharply rise both in Europe and in the 
United States. In the same time, if it was possible to observe something like a dead-lock 
concerning the public enforcement of the section 2 of the Sherman Act during the republican 
administration from 2000 to 2008 (with no antitrust case brought to courts on this basis by the 
US DoJ during the period), the situation was very different for the section 1. Both US and EU 
authorities are engaged in a policy consisting in increasing the fines in order to deter such 
practices. For example, the cumulated fines imposed by the European Commission grew from 
870 millions of Euros for the period 1990-1999 to 5122 for the period 2000-2006 
(Veljanovski, 2007). The fines imposed in each individual case also present such an increase. 
For example, in a decision of December 2010 relative to price collusion in the LCD panel 
market, the fines imposed to the six involved firms have reached 649 Million Euros. The 
higher sanction in a cartel agreement was the car glass decision in which the cumulated fines 
reached 1.38 Billion Euros. Even if the severity in the anti-cartel clauses enforcement 
decreased during the crisis, we can observe that the cumulated fines in 2010 reached 3.06 
Billion Euros, very close to the 2007 record of 3.38 Billions. 
Cartel deterrence is also increased by leniency programs, which play on the intrinsic 
instability of such agreements by allowing a firm which denounce such agreement to dispose 
from an immunity and by the additional threats constituted by follow-on suits for damages 
and especially in the US case (and in the UK one, to a some extent) by criminal sanctions. 
These ones cover both individual fines for the concerned executives but also imprisonment, 
which is effectively applied in the US. The deterrence effect is significantly increased and 
such risk helps to align individual and firms incentives. 
The severity for cartel agreements is a common feature of both systems. It is not surprising in 
the sense that coordinated practices are the most harmful anticompetitive practices. Things are 
more complex concerning the sanction of unilateral anticompetitive practices. US and 
European practices present some divergences, which could be explained trough the 
differences between the section 2 of the Sherman Act and the article 102 of the TFEU but also 
by two very different conceptions of the competition. 
In the US case, the Sherman Act aims at punishing monopolization strategies. That is to say, 
the strategies by which a firm acquires, maintains or extends (to another market) a monopoly 
position by unfair practices. If such a position is obtained by the merits there is no reason to 
contest it. The market process is driven by the search of such position, which gives a market 
power e.g. the ability to raise prices above the pure and perfect competition equilibrium level. 
Deterring such behavior by forbidding taking benefit from this market power would thwart 
the competition process itself and consequently would harm consumers. So, the Sherman Act 
does not forbid a dominant firm to extract the rents induced by its market power. In other 
words, a monopoly can – and also must – charge monopoly prices. Such a behavior is 
desirable just because it produces good incentives to competed firms to invest to acquire such 
a position. So, just monopolization is sanctioned and not what we can name in the European 
framework, exploitative abuses. 
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On the contrary, excessive pricing is an abuse on its own right in the European case. In an 
ordoliberal sense charging a monopoly price does not respect the as if condition. We must 
keep in mind that ordoliberal thinkers advocate a firm with a market power must behave as if 
it is price taker and not price maker. If exploitative abuses are originally considered as the 
main domain of article 102 implementation, excessive pricing decisions remain a rarity. In 
fact, exclusionary abuses quickly become predominant in EU completion law enforcement. 
The Commission guidance on exclusionary abuses conduct by dominant undertakings 
published in February 2009 testifies of such pivotal place in the European competition policy. 
Some Commission’s decisions relative to such market strategies can give striking example of 
transatlantic divergences and can help to define more precisely the specificities of the 
European competition policy applied to dominant firms. 
A key point to understand European analysis is to consider the concept of the special 
responsibility of the dominant firm to not impair by its market practices genuine undistorted 
competition on the common market. A dominant undertaking cannot adopt some strategies, 
which could be lawful if they were performed by a firm deprived of market power, if the 
effects of these could compromise the durability of a market structure of effective 
competition. This does not only induce an asymmetric regulation of competition but also 
could lead to impose upon the dominant firm to not implement any strategy that could lead to 
the market exit of a competitor. Competition is construed as an actual rivalry between 
competing firms. The protection of competition could easily shift to the protection of 
competitors.  Even though undertakings are incentivized to acquire market power and the 
natural result of the competition process could induce the exclusion of less efficient firms, 
European completion policy would lead to sanction a dominant operator as soon as its 
conduct is at the origin of such exclusion. In an ordoliberal conception, any competitor 
disappearance is susceptible to harm consumers because it reduces their possibility of choices 
and in the same time the competitive pressure on the dominant firm. On the contrary, for an 
US point of view, competitor exclusion must be sanctioned only if it was the consequence of 
unfair practices, which led to oust an equally efficient firm. If a firm obtains a monopoly 
position on its own merits, it does not constitute an antitrust laws violation. If a less efficient 
firm is excluded from the market, it does not harm consumers, since the chosen criterion is the 
maximization of its welfare and does take not into account its liberty of choice. 
Such divergences could be observed for many unilateral market practices. We just give some 
examples for three ones; predatory pricing, loyalty rebates and refusal to deal. The criteria 
used to characterize predatory strategies are very different in the European and in the US 
case-law. Economic literature establishes that a firm engages such strategies by accepting 
losses (or foregoing profits) in the short term so as to foreclose market or to discipline actual 
or potential competitors in order to acquire or to strengthen market power in a second stage. 
In other words, predation is no more than an investment in market power. 
For the European Commission, an undertaking engages such a strategy as soon as its price is 
set below its average avoidable cost or when the price level is set between this cost and the 
average total cost and it is possible the demonstrate the existence of a predation plan. On the 
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contrary, the US case law leads to consider that a firm cannot violate section 2 by accepting 
losses as soon as it has not a reasonable chance to recoup its investment in the second period. 
In other words, if the practice does not result in a market power increase  - for example 
because of new or potential entries -  such a strategy does not harm consumer (on the 
contrary). So the Brooke decision of the US Supreme Court in 1993 establishes that two 
conditions are to be met to characterize an anticompetitive behavior. First, the firm must 
establish its price below its cost and second it must a have a serious chance to recoup its 
initial losses. The standard of proof is higher than the European practice (for an example, see 
the Wanadoo decision of the Court of Justice, 2009) and in addition the burden of proof is on 
the plaintiff and not on the defender. 
A second example can be given by the case of loyalty rebates. For the European Commission 
some conditional rebates allowed by a dominant undertaking could even exclude an equally 
efficient competitor. The Intel decision of the Commission in May 2009 is one of the last 
examples of such European competition authority treatment of dominant undertaking market 
practices. If a dominant firm proposes to its consumers a retroactive rebate if its purchases 
exceed a given threshold over a defined period of reference, it could chose a threshold that 
induces the eviction of an equally efficient competitor as soon as this one is not able to 
compete for the whole demand. For example, if the competitor faces capacity constraints, the 
dominant firm could use the “non-contestable” part of the demand to leverage its dominant 
position on the “constable” one. If the threshold is set sufficiently high, even the competitor 
would be more efficient, a consumer could prefer choosing the dominant firm if the price 
difference does not compensate the loss of the rebate on the “non-contestable” part.  
The issue is that such analysis must not lead to prohibit per se loyalty rebates for dominant 
undertakings. They can be welfare enhancing and be justified on objective basis (anticipating 
scale economies for example). But, the EU jurisprudence does not impose to the Commission 
to demonstrate that the practices of the dominant firm have an effective exclusionary effect on 
the market (Wanadoo, General Court, 2007). There is a great contrast between such an 
analysis, which, amongst other things, led to a fine of 1.06 billion Euros and the attitude of the 
US DoJ, which did not brought a lawsuit against Intel. But, we must also note that a 
procedure was finally launched in the US by the FTC on these exclusionary practices. In July 
2010, Intel and the FTC reached a settlement on this case. 
A last example of such transatlantic divergences could be given by the treatment of refusals to 
deal. According the US jurisprudence, a firm, even a monopoly, remains free to contract or to 
refuse to contract with other firms and to choose the contractual terms. The price must be set, 
in principles, through a bilateral bargaining. No matter, if a monopoly price is charged. 
Particularly, an integrated firm is not deterred to supply an input to one of its competitor in a 
downstream market, since it is possible to capture all the rent produced through this price. As 
a consequence, there are no incentives (if some very restrictive hypothesis are verified) to 
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engage exclusionary strategies against competitors. Such reasoning could be applied to 
margin squeeze claims
2
. 
In the European case, a refusal to supply can constitute an exclusionary abuse. In some 
circumstances a refusal to deal with a competitor in a downstream market could lead to evince 
it from the market. The essential facility doctrine embodies such issue. A refusal to contract 
constitutes an abuse of dominant position if this refusal relates to a product that is objectively 
necessary to the second firm to compete effectively in a downstream market, if it is likely to 
lead to the elimination of effective competition on this last market, if it is not based on an 
objective justification and if it is likely to lead to consumer harm. 
The essential facility doctrine stems in fact from US case-law, especially from the Terminal 
Railroad decision of the Supreme Court (1912). But, since the nineties, US courts and 
scholars become more and more reluctant to use such doctrine (Areeda and Hovenkamp, 
2002). The main reason lies on the risk of strategic lawsuits and on the consequences on the 
incentives to invest and to innovate both for the dominant firm and for its competitors. In 
addition, deterrence effects on investment levels could be more important than the access 
price is set by a poorly informed third… that is to say, the Court. As a consequence, US courts 
- and the most prominent of them with the decision Trinko in 2004 - tend to reject such 
doctrine.  
In the same time, the essential facility doctrine is increasingly used at the European level for 
both tangible assets (network industries for example) and intangible ones. This second domain 
covers intellectual property rights. Some compulsory licensing decisions involved severe 
controversies, as for example the Microsoft decision in its part relative to interoperability 
protocol with the Windows operating system (2004). The European Commission had 
introduced two additional criteria to apply the essential facility doctrine to intangible assets. 
The first one is the new product criterion, the second one the balance of incentives. These two 
additional tests should avoid mandating an access, which finally harm consumers.  
The new product condition should help to prevent parasitism from the competitors. A license 
should be required if it allows to satisfy a potential demand. It appears that the requirement 
was significantly weakened by the European case law. From Magill (1995) to IMS (2004) and 
Microsoft (2004), the new product became a potential or a hypothetical one. Consequently, 
the access does not longer deals with a downstream market but with the same market… If 
such decision helps to create a level playing field for the competing firms, it also implies a 
kind of asymmetric regulation of competition to the detriment of the dominant firm. The 
consequences in terms of incentives must be taken into account.  
                                                          
2
 We can also note that margin squeeze is not considered in the US jurisprudence as an 
anticompetitive practice by itself, but just as combination of two different ones, an excessive 
price in the upstream market and a predatory one in the downstream market. It again induces a 
divergence between US and European competition policy, which could be illustrated by the 
Linkline decision of the US Supreme Court (2009) and the Deutsche Telekom decision of the 
European Court of Justice (2010). 
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The balance of the incentives should guarantee that the negative effect for radical innovations 
(innovations that allow to obtain a dominant position) for both the dominant firm and its 
competitors, which hope for substituted to it, is lesser than the positive one for follow-on 
innovations. In other words, we can observe an implicit trade-off between radical and 
incremental innovations. Implementing the essential facility doctrine reveals that the market is 
not seen as sufficiently turbulent to make a dominant position contestable.  But, in every case, 
granting compulsory licenses or deciding of a mandatory access always induces a trade-off 
between short-term and allocative efficiency and long-term and productive one… 
It also implies some hypothesis concerning intellectual property rights. Firstly, granting such 
compulsory licenses could make sense if we consider that competition policy has to 
counterweight possible excess regarding the practices of patent offices. For example, if the 
patents are too broad, they can be (mis)used as foreclosing tools. In this case, such decisions 
of competition authorities could restore collective optimality. The question remains if the 
judge of competition is the best suited in terms of information structure for performing this 
kind of task.  Secondly, it could induce a shift in the intellectual property rights from the right 
to exclude the third to a right to obtain a financial compensation. 
 
 
As a conclusion, we can underline that the differences between US and European competition 
policy do not derive from statute law, but from history, procedural and institutional 
dimensions and mainly from the decisional practice of the authorities which have to interpret 
the legislative acts. This interpretation process could embody some very different policies 
across space but also across time, as the US Antitrust history demonstrated. This dynamic – 
and these divergences – reveals in fact different compromises between economic efficiency 
considerations and economic actor fundamental rights (guarantee of property rights and 
contractual liberty) and to some extent differences in the conceptions of the competitive 
process by itself and the efficiency of government interventions. 
Firstly, the main difference between an ordoliberal minded competition policy and a Chicago 
School more influenced one, lies on the faith in the self-regulated nature of the market 
process. For the Freiburg School, the market process unavoidably converges towards the 
concentration of economic power and as a consequence, the laissez faire cannot be an option. 
Secondly, the ordoliberals consider that a government intervention (based on rules and not a 
discretionary one) could have a positive impact on the market process. Chicago Schools tends, 
on the contrary, to consider that Antitrust authority interventions always induce a significant 
risk of erroneous decisions (false positive or false negative cases). As the markets are 
supposed to be self-regulated, the collective cost of false negative decision is inferior to a 
false positive one. The reason lies on the fact that in the first case the supra-competitive level 
of profit realized by the firm would play as a signal for potential competitors. On the contrary, 
false positives play as a negative signal. The potential gains associated to a dominant position 
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become more uncertain for all the competitors (actual and potential). Consequently the 
damage caused to the competition process could be higher than the one induced by the 
absence of sanction of a monopoly position non-acquired on the merits (Easterbrook, 1984). 
Thirdly, we must underline the impact of the differences within the purpose assigned to 
competition policy. According to the Chicago School – and by extension for “a more 
economic approach” promoters - its purpose lies on the maximization of the consumer 
welfare. According the ordoliberals the objective is not the result of competition (e.g. the 
productive efficiency) but the competition process by itself (the access to the market, the 
economic liberty…). As competition policy is not just a mechanical implementation of 
objective and clear defined rules but covers some dimension of collective choice, divergences 
in space and time are finally explicable, logical and perhaps desirable. 
It appears that the primary purpose of competition policy is in all circumstances to protect the 
competition process. The highlighted difference between US and European cartel and 
monopoly policies is mainly based on the definition of their fundamental purpose. While the 
first one considers that the ultimate objective is to realize the market process natural result – 
e.g. consumer welfare maximization – the second one is focused on the process on itself and 
not directly on its output. In the European perspective, the freedom to access the market is a 
crucial point. All the market operators must access the market without seeing their freedom 
constrained by dominant firms’ market power. As a consequence, such undertaking must not 
impair by their practices this economic liberty. But this special duty of the dominant firm also 
induces difficulties in the competition law enforcement. Competition law is undoubtedly a 
case-based one. Both its interpretation and its dynamic derive from decisional practices. It 
induces a legal uncertainty for firms since the criterion decision are not always clear ex ante 
and the outcomes of trials difficult to predict. 
Such uncertainty could be all the more particularly harmful for a dominant undertaking that 
the convergence towards an effect-based assessment of market practices leads to a case-by-
case analysis, which results are difficult to forecast. In addition, the requirement of market 
practices self-assessment could make things worse. Such legal risks could compromise 
competition policy fundamental purpose, the promotion of economic efficiency. Dominant 
Firms could renounce to some market strategies, which could be profitable for consumers, 
taking into account such risks. 
Consequently, even cartel and monopoly policy is an essential requirement to ensure the 
functioning of the market process and to guarantee economic liberty (and perhaps political 
one, as the Freiburg School demonstrated), we must keep in mind that such policy could also 
induce some legal risks for firms. These ones could be due to the difficulties to anticipate of 
court decisions and also to the risk of inconsistent decisions between the different 
jurisdictions, induced, for example, by the specificities of US and European systems.  
Improving the efficiency of cartel and monopoly policies suppose to make Court decision 
criteria clearer and to progress in its international harmonization process (Gerber, 2010). 
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